

44 Nolan at Balaklava: Part VII: "Raglan, Cardigan and Queen Victoria"

by Dr Douglas J. Austin 44 [TWC 33(2) p3 2016]



Lord Raglan

Lord Cardigan

Queen Victoria

This article in my continuing series follows Hugh Small's challenging and excellent book *"The Crimean War: Queen Victoria's Wars with the Russian Tsars"* (Tempus, London, 2007) - which I know is required reading on the conflict. On pages 89-90, Hugh published and commented in detail on his transcription of a remarkable and previously unpublished letter from Lord Raglan to the 5th Duke of Newcastle, his civilian superior as Secretary of State for War - held by Nottingham University Library, Department of Manuscripts and Special Collections, under Newcastle Ne C 9893. Hugh's transcription reads as follows; my notes are labelled below as [*1]-[*6] and further to [*7]-[*14].

"Before Sebastopol October 28 1854

Private & Confidential

My dear Duke of Newcastle

You will read with great regret my despatch of this day reporting the operations before Balaklava.

*You will hardly be prepared for the bad conduct of the Turkish troops which shewed no fight whatever and abandoned works without the attempt to defend them [*1], which, though paltry enough, I am assured were superior to Arab Tabia [a fortress in the Balkans] that a handful of men held so long against all the efforts of Gorchakoff's army and thus they lost us some Guns of position which I thought would be safe in their hands at least for some hours. To contrast their conduct with that of our people it is worthy of mention that in each of the redoubts we had one single artillery man to shew the Turks how to use our Guns. This man spiked the Guns in the several works with one exception, alone and single handed [*2] whilst the Turks abandoned their duty and left him to shift for himself.*

But you will be much more shocked to see the loss sustained by our Light Cavalry. This indeed is a heavy misfortune notwithstanding the brilliancy of their conduct and I feel it most deeply.

The written order sent him by the quarter master general did not exact that Lord Lucan should attack at all hazards and contained no expression which could bear that construction but he so

*considered it, taunted I believe by the Officer who carried it and who appears to have conducted himself with great impropriety and assumed an authority which was wholly déplacé and for which he ought to have been reprovved instead of being listened to. [*3]*

*This officer was General Airey's Aide de Camp Captain Nolan. He actually put himself before the Squadron which Lord Cardigan led and cried almost like a Maniac 'Come on Come on' He was killed by the splinter of a shell which burst between the poor fellow and Cardigan. [*4]*

*This latter who is as brave as a lion absolutely thought it his duty to point out to Lord Lucan the artillery that he was about to attack and that which would oppose him on his flanks but the latter retained the idea that he had imbibed and fancied that he had no discretion to exercise. [*5] Fatal Mistake! My only consolation is the admirable conduct of the Troops which was beyond all praise.*

*I have heard that there was some bad feeling between Captain Nolan and Lord Lucan and that the former entertained it on account of the latter having spoken disparagingly of the horses he had purchased in Syria. [*6]*

*I have written to you thus unreservedly and in full confidence.
Believe me very faithfully yours Raglan "*

While Hugh's comments deserve to be read in full, they include:- *"The best way to defuse possible criticism of the failure to accompany the Charge [of the Light Brigade] by an infantry attack was to publicly emphasise that the Charge itself was a blunder. This Raglan took care to do immediately, with great skill. The letter that he wrote to the Minister of War has never been published and is worth quoting to show how skilfully he was to portray it as a blunder while diverting any criticism from himself."* Arising from that, I wish to present my own remarks on Raglan's letter.

[*1]:- "Behaviour of the Turkish Troops in the Causeway Redoubts".

Raglan repeated his negative assertions in his letter of 30th October, 1854, to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, the British Ambassador in Constantinople [NAM 1968-07-291]. *"In the larger work there were I believe as many as 700 men. To our astonishment & deep concern their troops made little or no resistance & rushed out of the forts before the enemy reached them, abandoning the guns, seven of which have fallen into the hands of the Russians."* In his formal despatch to the Duke of Newcastle dated October 28, 1854, he stated *"...The enemy commenced their operation by attacking the work [Redoubt 1] on our side of the village of Kamara, and, after very little resistance, carried it. They likewise got possession of the three others in contiguity of it, being opposed only in one [Redoubt 2], and that but for a very short space of time. The farthest of the three [Redoubt 4] they did not retain, but the immediate abandonment of the others enabled them to take possession of the guns in them, amounting in the whole to seven. Those in the three lesser forts [Redoubts 2, 3 and 4] were spiked by the one English artilleryman who was in each."*

In point of fact, the Turks in Redoubt I put up a brave resistance from first light (ca. 6.43 a.m.) until ca. 8.00 a.m., before retreating. Faced with severe direct artillery fire followed by an overwhelming infantry assault, they lost some 150 casualties out of ca. 500 men in Redoubt 1. Raglan, who only arrived on the scene at or soon after 8.00 a.m., acquired (and passed on) a wholly incorrect impression of events. The Turk's in Redoubt 1 were specifically commended by Lord Lucan and Sir Colin Campbell, who were both on the spot. Thus, Sir Colin Campbell's report to Adjutant-General Estcourt, dated October 27, 1854, stated *"...The Turkish troops in No 1 persisted as long as they could and then retired, and they suffered considerable loss in their retreat. This attack was followed by the successive abandonment of Nos. 2, 3 and 4 redoubts by the Turks as well as of the other posts held by them in our front. The guns however in Nos. 2, 3 and 4 were spiked."* In

addition, Nicholas Woods, the correspondent of the *"Morning Herald"* wrote in his 1855 book *"Much severe and, as far as regarded the redoubts, undeserved censure was cast on the Turks for their conduct in the battle. No troops could have held the miserable position which was assigned them....A contemptible bank was therefore, thought sufficient for their protection, and, because they failed to hold this against a whole army, they were at the time universally condemned."*

Accordingly, I regard Raglan's remarks as fundamentally untrue.

[*2]:- "British Gunners in the Causeway Redoubts".

Generous advice from Mike Hargreave Mawson allows me to report the following awards to three of the British artillerymen stationed with the Turks in the Causeway Redoubts. Those awards were published in *"Medals of the British Army and How they were Won"* by Thomas Carter, Groombridge and Sons, London, 1861. (Mike informs us that neither the Medaille Militaire nor the Al Valore Militare was awarded posthumously.)

FRENCH MILITARY MEDAL:-

Acting Bombardier David Jenkins. — Spiked the guns in the redoubt on Canrobert's Hill, on the 25th. of October, 1854; remained in the work after the Turks evacuated it; and although the Russians were advancing rapidly up the hill, he did not quit the place until he had spiked every gun. Lord Raglan mentioned his name in a despatch, and by Her Majesty's command, the names of Gunner Jenkins and three [two?] others were forwarded to the Horse Guards. [**N.B. If Jenkins was posted in Redoubt 1, this conflicts with Sir Colin Campbell's report given above. It seems possible that the guns in Redoubt 4 were left unspiked.]**

SARDINIAN MEDAL:-

Gunner and Driver John Barrett. — Served at the battle of the Alma, and was detached with the Turks in one of the advanced redoubts in front of Balaklava, on the 25th of October, 1854. When the Turks retired from the redoubts on the advance of the Russians, he remained to spike the guns in his charge, for which conduct he received the approval of Her Majesty, conveyed through the Secretary of State for War.

SARDINIAN MEDAL:-

Gunner and Driver Jacob McGarry. — Served at the battle of the Alma, and was detached with the Turks in one of the advanced redoubts in front of Balaklava, on the 25th. of October, 1854. Upon the Turks retiring from the redoubts on the advance of the Russians, he remained to spike the guns in his charge, for which conduct he received the approval of Her Majesty, conveyed through the Secretary of State for War.

In 1910, McGarry was presented to Lord Kitchener, an event recorded on the New Zealand *"PapersPast"* website as appearing in the *"Press"*, Volume LXVI, Issue 13665, 23 February 1910. The account reads as follows:- *"Further on down the line the inspecting officer displayed considerable interest in the decorations worn by Mr. Jacob McGarry, an old artillery man, who had served through the Crimea. "What is this medal?" said Lord Kitchener, pointing to a plain-looking silver medal attached to a blue ribbon. "That is the Sardinian medal for valour, sir, " was the reply. "That must be rather rare. How and where did you get it?" queried Lord Kitchener. "I got it at Balaclava, sir, for spiking some guns in a battery the Russians were just breaking into," was the reply. "You must let me shake hands with you, " said "K. of K.," and he proceeded to do so, and before leaving wished Mr. McGarry good health and a long life... The story of Mr. McGarry's feat for which he received the Sardinian medal for valour will bear repetition. He was in a redoubt with some Turkish gunners, who were behaving very badly, and a couple of 18-pounder guns [**12-pounder: possibly Redoubt 2 or 3?]**. A large body of the Russian infantry rushed the redoubt, the Turks fled in all directions, leaving McGarry alone in the battery. He saw the position was*

irretrievably lost, but before making good his escape he rendered the guns useless to the Russian by driving steel spikes into the touchholes. He just finished his work in time, and managed to drop over the parapet into a ditch as the Russians swarmed over the redoubt. "How I managed to remain unseen. I don't know," said McGarry, "for I was wearing a very conspicuous uniform, but I did manage to lie hid in some scrub and eventually got back to the British lines."

[*3]:- **"Quarter Master General", "Impropriety" and "Déplacé".**

"Quarter Master General" : Hugh rightly remarks *"Even more accomplished is Raglan's statement that the order was the product of the quartermaster-general (General Airey), who only wrote it out at Raglan's command."* [**Can we infer an attempt (by Raglan) to dilute and divert a measure of blame, while admitting his own authority and initiative?**]

"Impropriety" : John Blunt, the civilian interpreter John Blunt who was present when the 4th Order was delivered, stated in his *"Reminiscences"* [D.J. Austin, CWRS SP33] that *"After reading the order Lord Lucan had a discussion with Nolan, who, pointing to the Russian position in an excited manner, I heard him exclaim vehemently, 'There, My Lord, is your enemy, there are your guns' . His Lordship was surprised and appeared to be irritated by the very impetuous and disrespectful attitude and tone of Captain Nolan, looked at him sternly but made no answer, and after some hesitation, proceeded to give orders to Lord Cardigan to charge the enemy with the Light Brigade and to the Heavy Brigade to advance in support, and at the same time went to accompany the latter."* I conclude that Raglan was correct to assert that Nolan "conducted himself with great impropriety". Nolan clearly failed to provide Lucan with unequivocal instructions and Lucan clearly failed to demand proper clarification of the grossly ambiguous 4th Order written by Airey (effectively Raglan's Chief of Staff). How, indeed, do we know that Airey had properly written out Raglan's instructions? In his nightly diary, Hugh Rose wrote *"Lord Raglan seemed agitated, took Airey aside and said "They say that all this happened on account of the order you sent by Nolan to retake the guns."* This clearly implies that Raglan (at first) held Airey responsible for the losses. During the afternoon, he blamed Cardigan and then, later, Lucan. Rose reports that Raglan spoke of an order sent by Airey to 'retake' what could only have been captured British guns. Most significantly, none of the four written orders to the Cavalry included any specific instruction to 'take' or 'retake' guns but I have shown that an earlier verbal order to that effect - carried down by Nolan - was directly refused by Lucan and Cardigan. Was Airey the "someone who blundered"? (He certainly did that day, when he mistakenly ordered Barker's artillery to withdraw its protection from the 93rd Highlanders.) Reportedly, he never spoke of Balaklava in later life, but he was among the subscribers to the (since stolen) memorial in Holy Trinity Church, Maidstone, which praised Nolan as **"...ONE OF THE MOST GALLANT, INTELLIGENT, AND ENERGETIC OFFICERS IN HER MAJESTY'S SER VICE."**

"Déplacé" : This French word can mean, variously, "improper - out of order - uncalled-for - unseemly - untimely - unwarranted - inappropriate - incorrect - out of line". I note that "Queen's Regulations and Orders for the Army" dated 1st July, 1844 (unchanged in the 1854 Edition), reads as follows on page 59:- **"Aides-de-Camp. 30. ALL Orders sent by Aides-de-Camp are to be delivered in the plainest terms, and are to obeyed with the same readiness as if delivered personally by the General Officers to whom such Aides-de-Camp are attached."** NO other definition of an aide-de-camp's duties and authority are presented. Major-General Richard Airey was operating as Raglan's Chief of Staff and Captain Nolan, as his aide-de-camp, was his representative in the North Valley. In this context, Raglan's use of the term **"déplacé"**, an assertion that Nolan had grossly exceeded his authority, was certainly disgracefully wrong. I regard Raglan's remark as blatantly untrue - **perhaps better defined as an astonishing and outright lie** - directed to his civilian superior in London. I must presume that he did this on the basis that the Secretary of State for War would neither know of nor realise the full force and implications of the *"Queen's*

Regulations" directive. While Raglan identified a (conveniently dead) scapegoat, I am persuaded that Raglan was entirely wrong in his letter and that he was attempting (perhaps succeeding?) in a "cover-up" of his own command and control failures..

[*4] "Captain Nolan's Final Actions

In a previous article (*Nolan at Balaklava: Part V*, 'The War Correspondent', 26 (4), 14-22, 2009), I concluded that "...*compelling evidence exists that Nolan did try to divert (N.B. not 'lead' or 'command') the Light Brigade after it moved off without changing front, at least towards the Causeway Heights.*" Given the immediacy of the C-in-C's demand, I believe that Nolan did not read the 4th Order and that he assumed that it was explicit. In fact, it did not identify the target guns, nor did it suggest or require that the cavalry should change front before advancing. Neither Lucan nor Nolan realised that there was a misunderstanding and they did not interrogate each other. Beyond doubt, Lucan and Cardigan then took it that the direction of advance was literally 'to the front' as their Brigades were then disposed - due East down the North Valley. Nolan broke ranks (wholly contrary to "*Queen's Regulations*") in an act of desperation and tried, in vain, to remedy a gross error. That single act, outrageous on the face of it, was enough for many (with little or no direct knowledge of the man or the event) then to brand Nolan as a hothead or worse and to level heavy and persistent accusations against him. Raglan, ignoring Canrobert's advice, bears the ultimate responsibility for the "*4th Order to the cavalry.*" I remain unaware of evidence contradicting those views.

I believe that Nolan did attempt to divert the Light Brigade SE towards the Causeway Heights and, very probably, over them to the South Valley of Balaklava. While shielded there (to some extent) from Russian gun and rifle fire from the North, the Light Brigade could recapture or at least inhibit the removal of British 12-pounders, via the S and SE-facing exits from Redoubts 1, 2 and 3. I believe that he was given verbal instructions to that effect by Raglan and Airey (cf. Somerset Gough-Calthorpe) - supplementary to the notorious written 4th Order. Nolan offered "*I'll lead them myself, I'll take & lead them on*" (cf. Hugh Rose) and he may very well have been authorised and instructed to do so. In the event, just after 11 a.m., as the first line of the Light Brigade set off at a walk, Nolan, who was riding near the squadron of direction of the 17th Lancers, galloped forward & and to his right, waving his sword and shouting, when the first shell fired by the Russians exploded near him and he fell dead.

According to a letter (NAM-1968-07-484) dated 27th October, 1854, written by Captain Edward Thomas Gage, RA, of the Headquarters Staff:- "*Genl. Airey's A.D.C. Capt Nolan (to whom this misfortune is attributed by giving wrong orders) was killed by the 1st. shot, screeching like a madman to the Brigade, "Are you not coming on, follow me" he received a shot in the breast & fell dead. Ld. L. was doubtful about the order he brought & hesitated, seeing the Enemy every where. He naturally wanted some decisive orders where to charge, upon which Nolan said "My Lord, you see the Enemy" and burst out in this excited manner, & infected all the others, there was no stopping them*". From this and from Raglan's letter, I presume that it was Cardigan himself who passed on Nolan's last words.

Staff Officer Captain John Alexander Ewart of the 93rd Foot, DAQMG from October 9th, 1854 to 15th February, 1855, published some final details on Nolan's fate in Volume I (pp 264-273) of his excellent book "*The Story of a Soldier's Life*", Sampson Low et al, London, 1881. Thus:- "...Our cavalry' having been in the valley on the other side of the ridge, we had seen nothing of them, and had no idea that a charge had been made. I now crossed the ridge, and galloped forward in the direction of the enemy, and at no very great distance down the valley found, first of all, poor Nolan (Aide-de-Camp to General Airey), who had a dreadful wound in his chest, and was quite dead....Making signs that I urgently wanted assistance, I at last persuaded about half-a-dozen to

accompany me, and on reaching Nolan's body, got two of them to lift it. I then went on with the others to Morris and the Dragoon, but just at this moment the Russians opened fire, and one or two round shot whizzed by. In an instant poor Nolan was dropped, and away ran the whole of the Turks back to the redoubt. I could do nothing alone, so again went for help, and seeing some one on horseback (I don't remember who it was), begged him to go as hard as he could to the 17th Lancers, and to tell them that their Commanding Officer was lying badly wounded in front, and that some stretchers ought to be sent at once. He promised to go immediately, and I now returned to Sir George, whose division had remained stationary on the other side of the ridge. Some little time afterwards one or two stretchers appeared, and Morris, the Dragoon, and poor Nolan, were brought in - the Russians again firing. The last time I saw the former he was having his wounds looked to by a surgeon, on the side of the hill near No. 4 redoubt. The body of the latter was, I believe, buried the same afternoon in the ditch of No. 5 redoubt..."

[*5]"Discretion"

On his page 90, Hugh tells us:- *"In his separate published despatches, Lord Raglan criticised openly the general (Lucan) who had obeyed his orders and omitted to mention that General Cathcart had refused point-blank to obey them."* I can confirm and amplify this somewhat because I have transcribed Cathcart's Morning Report (26th October, 1854) on his 4th Division's part in the battle, addressed to Airey, [*Article in press*]. The account later published by Captain John Alexander Ewart (DAQMG from October 9th, 1854 to 15th February, 1855) states that Cathcart three times declined to obey the verbal order brought to him towards 8.00 a.m. Cathcart exercised a General's discretion because the greater portion of his men had only just come back from the trenches and because, on 21st October, Lord Raglan had been induced by a similar report to send down 1000 men of the 4th Division, who had to be marched back when it proved that the enemy was not advancing. In his account, Ewart claimed that his renewed urging finally persuaded Cathcart to move his troops. Cathcart's battle report makes it very clear, however, that he did so only on receipt of a written order from Airey, which he received at 8.45 a.m. Thereafter, Ewart accompanied Cathcart down to the North Valley as a guide. They were met there by Airey, who delivered further orders to Cathcart.

[*6]:- "Horses"

Nolan's detailed journal shows him to be heavily critical of Lucan as a cavalry commander, but there seems little evidence that Lucan complained about the horses Nolan and others obtained for the campaign. Lucan stated that there was no standing disagreement between them. Raglan strongly favoured Cardigan over Lucan and may have overstated the Lucan/Nolan situation. As an aside, John Blunt recorded that Nolan was *"a general favourite at headquarters"* and very popular with the French. Remarkably, Lord Raglan kept some of Nolan's horse tackle as a souvenir of him.

[*7]"Investigation"

William Howard Russell, the Special Correspondent of *"The Times"* in the Crimea, in his report dated 28th October 1854, stated *"There is a rumour that the cause of our disaster is being closely investigated by the authorities, and that it does not appear poor Captain Nolan was so much to blame as was at first supposed by those who did not know his strict character as an officer and a soldier"*. Nolan's obituary, printed in the *"Illustrated London News"* on 25th November, 1854, included *"We are aware that in the first accounts of the disastrous charge at Balaclava, blame was hastily attached to Captain Nolan, who, it was alleged, had gone beyond the terms of an order which he was instructed to deliver to Lord Lucan; his memory has, however, we are glad to find, been subsequently vindicated from so grave an imputation, and all who knew him best in the closest relations of military life, and his punctilious character on all points of duty, assert that he would*

have been the last man to be guilty of the indiscretion attributed to him..." Furthermore, a set of watercolours painted by Captain Soame Gambier Jenyns (13th Light Dragoons) includes a label which states "*...In the Charge of the Light Brigade he found himself in command of the remnant of the Regt. as senior surviving Officer. He was awarded a .CB. & was an important witness in the investigation of Lord Cardigan and Capt Nolan....*". Indeed, Cardigan and Jenyns were close together as they rode into the Russian Don Heavy No. 3 Battery.

While a specific written record of such an investigation has not yet come to light, the Earl of Cardigan did produce no less than three versions (with minor textual and pagination differences) of a formal but unaddressed memoranda on the 27th October, 1854 - just 2 days after the event. Two of these documents are certainly in Cardigan's handwriting. The **first (holograph)** is held in the Raglan Papers (NAM 1968-07-288-2). The **second version (in an unknown hand)** was sent as an enclosure by Viscount Henry Hardinge (General Commanding in Chief at Horse Guards) to the 5th Duke of Newcastle (Secretary for War) on 22nd January, 1855:-

(http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/mss/online/online-mss-catalogues/cats/newc_5thdukeconts.html).

That document, listed as Ne C 10089/2-3, was sent by Cardigan to Hardinge shortly after both met with Queen Victoria on 17th January, 1855 (see below). Its dispatch was perhaps inspired by that meeting with Her Majesty? The **third (holograph)** was included in a group of Lucan papers sold by Phillips Auctioneers, London: (*Catalogue of Auction - 17th November, 2000*: pp 130-132; transcribed on p 131) and described in the "Sunday Telegraph" for 5th November, 2000).

Presumably, the third was sent to Lucan by Raglan or Cardigan. I believe that together they represent Cardigan's written report to Raglan, with copies to Lucan and (later) to Hardinge. The version in the Raglan Papers reads as below. I have added [*8] and [*9] to show the extra words in the second and third versions:-

"Memorandum

*On the afternoon of the 25th: inst. when in sight of the Russian Army, I perceived that our Cavalry were on the point of being employed, I sent my Aid de Camp Mr. Maxse to the Lt. General Comg the Division to say that the height which flanked the valley leading to the Russian battery' of heavy guns was covered with Artillery & Riflemen. The answer was we were going to attack. A few minutes afterwards the Lt General came in front of the Brigade, ordered the 11th Hussars to fall back in support and told me to attack the Russians in the valley about $\frac{3}{4}$ of a mile distant with the 13th Lt Dragoons & 17th Lancers. I replied "Certainly but allow me to point out to you that the hills on each side are covered with Artillery & Riflemen. The Lt General replied "I cannot help it, you must attack, Lord Raglan desires the Lt Brigade immediately to attack the enemy_ A few minutes afterwards whilst advancing- (*8) Capt Nolan came in front of the Brigade with a view as it appeared of hurrying it on_ (*9) A shell burst between him & me which was the cause of his death_ I led the Brigade down the Hill in front of the Russian battery of heavy guns firing shell - grape shot & round shot- we rode straight thro' the Guns - and the two regiments the 13th Lt Dragoons & 17th Lancers leading; and the 2nd line consisting of the 4th Lt Dragoons & 11th Hussars - & the support of the 8th Hussars also passed thro' the batteries & got engaged with the Cossacks & Russian Cavalry in the rear - both in advancing & retiring a great many of the Russian gunners were cut down; & several of their horses killed. We were exposed all the way to a double flank fire of Riflemen and Artillery; & many men & horses fell on the retreat from their flank fire.*
Cardigan Major Genl
Comg. Lt Cavalry Brigade
Balaklava Camp
Oct 27th 1854"

[*8] "Ne C (2nd) version "

"...to the attack Captain Nolan of the Quarter Master General's Staff came in front of the Brigade with a view, as it appeared, of hurrying it on. I tried to get him to halt to explain what was required by Head Quarters to be done; but before he did so,..."

[*9] "Phillips (3rd) version "

"...I had no conversation with the Officer, he did not halt his horse; but a few minutes afterwards..."

Happily, page scans of Queen Victoria's Journal (as copied by HRH Princess Beatrice) are available on-line at <http://www.queenvictoriasjournals.org/home.do>. It is now possible (with permission) to extend on Cardigan's account of this dismal event. After his return (on medical grounds) from the Crimea in December, 1854, the Earl found himself regarded as a hero and subject to extreme public adulation - to which he clearly believed himself entitled. He was invited to meet Queen Victoria and the Royal family at Windsor Castle in mid-January, 1855, when he enlarged on his earlier version of events. He confirmed that he had attempted to get more information from Nolan. My transcription of the relevant Royal Journal entries reads as follows:-

"January 16th, 1855

*"... Albert saw Ld. Cardigan, before dinner, who has just come home on sick leave. - Mama, &c, & Ld. Cardigan (come for two nights) dined. Ct. Walewski sat again next to me and was "tres aimable". After dinner talked for some time with Ld. Cardigan, who is grown thinner & older, though he does not look ill otherwise. He seemed quite touched when I told him that he had gone so brilliantly through such great dangers. He said that the sickness & sufferings were great, but that the want of food and various other difficulties had arisen since he left. The most anxious time he had passed through, was when he made that reconnaissance from Varna to the Dobrutzscha to look for the Russians. He spoke of the unfortunate murderous Charge, for which, he told the Duke of Newcastle plainly, Ld. Lucan was entirely to blame by misconceiving Ld. Raglan's orders, not obeying them and not exposing himself. [*10] Ld. Cardigan said that not one of the officers who went into that action, he believed, ever thought they would return out of it alive! He was slightly wounded by 2 Cossacks, but thought of too little consequence to mention. His horse was not touched. The death of Capt. Nolan was one of the strangest things he knew. [At the moment of death, Nolan's body - with his right arm held high - appears to have been frozen in a so-called "cadaveric spasm"] Ld. Cardigan had ridden in front of him & had called to him: "Capt. Nolan, halt, I wish for some information", being anxious to know what Ld. Raglan's real message had been; [*11] but Capt. Nolan would not listen, & before Ld. Cardigan could speak again, a shell burst between their horses, with a tremendous explosion, Capt Nolan throwing his arm up in the air, turning his horse round, & giving an appalling scream, rode to the rear, where he almost immediately afterwards fell dead to the ground! Ld. Cardigan had at first thought he was only slightly wounded, & could not bear pain. Ld. C. is most confident that Sevastopol must fall, very shortly...."*

[*10]:- "not exposing".

This can be interpreted as a gross slander (at the highest level) on a brother officer. In following the Light Brigade part-way to the guns, the Heavy Brigade took many more casualties than in their own triumphant charge. Lucan was hit by a spent ball and his horse was hit twice. I believe that Cardigan was complaining that Lucan had not lead the entire Cavalry Brigade from the front. Given the death-trap before them, Lucan acted wisely in splitting the commands of the Light and Heavy Brigades (just as Cardigan split the command of the Light Brigade between himself and Paget).

[*11]:- "*real message*".

This accords with the **second** version of Cardigan's memorandum, as sent on to the Duke of Newcastle by Hardinge in late January, 1855. It does NOT accord with either the **first** (to Raglan) or **third** (to Lucan) versions, dated 27th October, 1854. Facing into an obvious deathtrap, Cardigan (rightly) could not accept the verbal "Attack immediately!" Order as Raglan's intention. Did Cardigan omit his wish from the earlier versions to avoid embarrassing Raglan?

"January 17th, 1855

*... We had a long conversation with the Duke of Newcastle about the Army & the state of affairs concerning it, - discussing what measures should be taken to prepare, &c... - the advisability of recalling Ld. Lucan, who had shown himself unfit, & putting Ld. Cardigan in his place, for which he is quite fit, - ... Ld. Hardinge was the addition to our dinner. Had much talk with Ld. Cardigan, who sat next to me, of the war, & the details connected with it. He says that the Commissariat is very bad, but did not tell Ld. Raglan so, not thinking it was his duty. The Doctors were deficient, there were few or no medicines & medicaments, & this was so from the 1st, which is quite inconceivable, considering all that was sent out. The real mischief, he believes, had arisen from the order to embark in light marching order, when they started for the Crimea. The result had been, that the poor men had been without their kits or any of the necessities quite essential to a soldier. They had therefore never been able to help themselves or make themselves comfortable, & were in need of everything. There were no hammers, nails, bill hooks &c - so no wood could be obtained, & they could not construct anything. The things never came, never were sent for, & when enquired about, no one knew where they were. Hence, all the misery & suffering. This is really unpardonable. The poor horses were half starved & almost all dead! - After dinner Ld. Cardigan showed us a very pretty water colour sketch by Mr. Simpson, whose sketches done in the Crimea, had been sent to us. This one, was of the Charge of Balaklava, which Ld. Cardigan then described, very simply & graphically, - very modestly, as to his own wonderful heroism, - but with evident & very natural satisfaction. They charged for $\frac{3}{4}$ of a mile, down a hill, fired upon in every direction, from the batteries, taken from the Turks, & by Riflemen, the only exception being on their flank. In this way they lost many men, before the actual Charge began. They only numbered 700 & the Russian Cavalry, opposed to them, 5000, besides Field Batteries. In spite of this they had sabred all the gunners, & put the Russian Cavalry into great confusion, killing a great number, so that the Light Brigade was not pursued, as it ought to have been done. Lord Cardigan himself, had had a marvellous escape, one of the guns exploding, just as he passed close to the muzzle, the concussion literally lifting the horse off the ground. The smoke had been so thick, that he did not know where he was & suddenly had found himself in the midst of a number of Cossacks, - almost alone, alone! In avoiding the limber of a gun, he had ridden on one side, his men on the other, when 3 Cossacks rode at him with their lances, which are very heavy, one, wounding him in the hip the lance touching the bone, & the other grazing his leg. He was thrown out of his saddle, & thought all was over with him, when, with a great effort he resealed himself, cut his way through [**This is very questionable.**], & escaped, his horse not being even touched!*

January 18th, 1855

"After breakfast, we took the Children into the Corridor, to see Ld. Cardigan, who explained again the whole of his experiences to them. We remained talking with him some little time afterwards & then he took leave. ...".

[*12]:- "The 4th Order".

The "4th Order" reads as follows:- "Lord Raglan wishes the cavalry to advance rapidly to the front - follow the enemy and try to prevent the enemy carrying away the guns - Troop Horse Artillery may accompany - French cavalry is on your left. R Airey. Immediate." Generated under extreme pressure from Raglan, it makes so little immediate sense that I am convinced that Nolan was given supplementary instructions (cf Somerset Gough-Calthorpe) to clarify it. Very badly drafted by Airey, while not specifying an attack as such, it does not precisely define either the direction of advance or, indeed, the nationality of the guns being (or shortly to be) removed. It does not inform Lucan that he could create simultaneous advances against the Fedioukine and Causeway Heights by using the 4th Chasseurs d'Afrique. They had been ceded for the moment to Raglan by Canrobert and were at British disposal. How unfortunate that Airey did not add the the single word "English " or "British " to the order, that Nolan did not press supplementary instructions on Lucan and that Lucan did not demand instant clarification from Nolan! An outstanding example of discipline and bravery ended in bloody failure, even though it terrified the enemy.

SUMMARY:-

Further to my series of articles in this journal, a defensible scenario for the crowded final minutes of the life of Captain Lewis Edward Nolan is at last achievable. While new evidence (in confirmation or denial) may come to light, I feel it appropriate to publish my present views as follows:-

1. In discussion with Raglan and Airey, Nolan is given a verbal order for Lucan, but is called back and handed the written 4th Order, which he does NOT read. [**Understandable, given the urgency.**] Raglan calls to Nolan "*Tell Lord Lucan that the cavalry is attack immediately!*"
2. Nolan meets Lucan, Civilian Interpreter Blunt and Trumpet Major Henry Joy near Redoubt 5. [**Guns and enemy are NOT visible from that location.**]
3. Nolan hands over the written 4th Order and passes on Raglan's verbal "*Attack immediately!*" Order.
4. Lucan reads the written 4th Order and queries the verbal "*Attack immediately!*" Order. [**Understandable, given the conflict between the orders.**]
5. Nolan gestures vaguely eastwards and says "*There, My Lord, is your enemy, there are your guns!*" - entirely WITHOUT clarification. [**Understandable, because he did not know the written order's content.**]
6. Lucan does NOT question Nolan further. [**Understandable, given the "QRegs" directive and the urgency.**]
7. Lucan, Nolan, Blunt and Joy move to the Light Brigade front to locate Cardigan.
8. Lucan tells Cardigan of the verbal "*Attack immediately!*" Order but does NOT share the written 4th Order. [**Understandable, given the "QRegs" directive and the urgency.**] Cardigan remonstrates (rightly) and is overruled.

9. Lucan orders the 11th Hussars back in support. Lucan, Joy and Blunt move to Heavy Brigade front. Lucan hands the written 4th Order to Blunt and tells him NOT to follow. Blunt moves towards Redoubt 5. Lucan and Joy proceed to direct the Heavy Brigade to support the Light Brigade.
10. Nolan tells Cardigan - "*Lord Raglan orders you to attack the enemy & retake the guns!*" or "*Lord Raglan orders you to charge the enemy & take those guns!*" [Two letters from Captain Jenyns 13LD]. Nolan has an altercation with Cardigan, allegedly saying "*Is the Light Cavalry afraid?*".
11. Cardigan orders the (right) 1st squadron of the 17th Lancers as the "*Squadron of Direction*".
12. Nolan joins Captain William Morris before the 17th Lancers with an intention to "lead them on!". Cardigan orders the Light Brigade to "Walk, Trot, March!".
13. Nolan leaves the centre of the 17th Lancers, gestures "*Right engage!*" with his sword and orders the 17th Lancers to angle "Threes right!" - towards the Causeway Heights.
14. Captain John Winter's (left) 2nd squadron of the 17th Lancers starts to angle "*Threes right!*", but they are ordered back into line by Cardigan, echoed by Corporal Nunnerley (Morley).
15. 17th Lancers pause to reform their line - wrongly seen as a "*Lower curb chains!*" operation by a French observer. [That is NOT a British Cavalry action (Larsen)].
16. Nolan crosses diagonally in front of Cardigan, pointing and heading towards the Causeway Heights while shouting "...almost like a Maniac "*Come on, come on!*" (Raglan) or "*...screeching like a madman to the Brigade, Are you not coming on, follow me!*" (Gage). N.B.: The "*follow me!*" accords with Nolan's "*I'll take and lead them on!*" and with the "QRegs" directive.
17. Cardigan tries (but fails) to interrogate Nolan.
18. Nolan screams as he is killed by a shell fragment and "freezes" with his right arm high. His horse turns to its right and moves back through the squadron interval of the 13th Light Dragoons.
19. Nolan's body is dragged and kicked by his horse before detaching from the stirrup. [2 Witness statements.]

[*13]:- "Poetry".

In my article on Tennyson's poem "*The Charge of the Light Brigade*" ("*The War Correspondent*", 26, 7 & 19, 2008), I noted that Tennyson named the "blunderer" firstly as "**Nolan**", later as "**Captain**" and finally as "**Someone**". Perhaps the scapegoating of Captain Lewis Edward Nolan was finally recognised - at least by some?

[*14*]:- "Blame".

I believe that Raglan, in his insistence on the emotionally important (but tactically needless) recovery of guns and his ignoring Canrobert's good advice to the contrary, was by far the guilty party. Airey, Lucan and Nolan were clearly at fault, but to a lesser degree. Cardigan was blameless, on this occasion at least.

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